Frontline
Volume 25 - Issue 13 :: Jun. 21-Jul. 04, 2008
INDIA'S NATIONAL MAGAZINE
from the publishers of THE HINDU • Contents
ESSAY
Merchants of hate
A.G. NOORANI
The BJP’s equation of Muslims with terrorists is part of a wider Hindutva agenda.
KRISHNENDU HALDER/REUTERS
BJP activists in Hyderabad burning the effigy of a "terrorist" after the Jaipur explosions, on May 14. The party seems determined not only to politicise the mayhem caused by terrorists but also to communalise it.
IT is woefully clear that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is out to play the Hindutva card with great fervour in the next Lok Sabha elections. It has decided not only to politicise the mayhem that terrorists cause but to communalise it as well. It will target the Muslim community as a culprit to be denounced and a perpetrator to be punished. The cry for the re-enactment of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) was revived after the Jaipur blasts on May 13. But the terms in which the plea is couched have escaped notice.
Let me quote from an authentic report in the Organiser of May 25 of BJP leader L.K. Advani’s considered statement on the blasts. His attack on the United Progressive Allliance (UPA) government is well known, but not so well known is his attack on Muslims. The government is “unwilling to summon the requisite political will to mount a comprehensive attack on terrorism for fear of losing its vote bank”. Read: for fear of alienating Muslims. The innuendo is not veiled. The expression he used – “vote bank” – is Advani’s notorious shorthand for Muslims. He added: “Evidently, terrorist outfits have come to believe that they have nothing to fear so long as the UPA government is in office at the Centre. Guided by the same vote bank considerations the UPA government repealed POTA soon after assuming office in May 2004.”
He suppressed the facts that POTA had nothing to show by way of results, that its application was communally selective, especially in Gujarat, and that it had incurred censures of respected international human rights bodies.
BJP president Rajnath Singh sang the same tune, as Organiser quoted him: “Any strong action against terrorism will weaken its vote bank politics.” On June 1, he referred to the fatwa of the respected seminary Darul Uloom in Deoband on May 31 denouncing terrorism and said: “Darul Uloom is seeking to dissociate Muslims from terrorism when the Congress-led government wishes to equate Muslims with terrorism and, on this basis, rejects the demand for enactment of an anti-terror law.”
This is Orwell’s double-speak. The “basis” – equating Muslims with terrorism – is entirely a BJP creation, as his and Advani’s statements earlier establish. Rajnath Singh made it plain that the BJP’s equation of Muslims with terrorists would be an integral part of a wider Hindutva agenda.
“Along with cultural nationalism [read: Hindutva], Article 370, uniform civil code and true [sic.] secularism, we are committed to preserve the national unity and integrity” (Hindustan Times, June 2, 2008).
In its Annual Report of 2008, Amnesty International noted the cries for reviving POTA. “Demands for new domestic anti-terror legislation continued. The Armed Forces Special Powers Act, 1958 was not repealed despite protests” (page 153).
POTA’s predecessor, the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA), had proved worthless and 72,000 of the 77,000 people arrested under it were released without charge. Only 1.8 per cent of those prosecuted were convicted.
POTA not the same as TADA
But there is a sharp difference between the two laws, as the noted scholar Ujjwal Kumar Singh points out in his outstandingly able work The State, Democracy and Anti-Terror Laws in India (Sage, pages 244). He writes: “A significant distinction between TADA and POTO/POTA, indicative of the political context within which POTA has been brought, is that while TADA did not carry a central image of the nation or national security, the latter carries an image that is part of the Hindutva agenda of the nation and national security…. Moreover, while identifying ‘terrorist activities’, TADA specifically mentioned ‘threatening harmony between communities’ as an act of terror. Following widespread allegations of its targeted use against religious minorities, POTA removed ‘threatening harmony between communities’ from the ambit of ‘terrorist activities’, purportedly as ‘a safeguard’. Far from being a safeguard, the removal translated in practice into a deflection of attention from the communal activities of Hindu fundamentalist organisations, while the Act continued to be used selectively against the Muslim community.
“Perhaps the most prominent selective use of POTA is in Gujarat where out of 250 persons against whom POTA has been imposed, 249 are Muslims. The majority of POTA cases in Gujarat have resulted from its application in the Sabarmati train burning case in Godhra. Curiously while the circumstances of the tragic train burning incident were and still continue to be pieced together, the Chief Minister of Gujarat, Narendra Modi, declared it a ‘terrorist act’ immediately after it occurred. In the midst of the unbridled brutalities unleashed against Muslims in different parts of Gujarat, on 2 March, 2002, Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (POTO) was applied in the train burning case. Contrary to popular perception, POTO was not subsequently ‘withdrawn’. It was only kept in abeyance, that is, deferred, till more suitable circumstances presented themselves. The fact that POTO, still an ordinance, was to come up before the Parliament for approval before it became an Act, was perhaps an important consideration. POTA got enacted in an extraordinary joint session of Parliament on 26 March 2003, and almost simultaneously, the Act was re-invoked in the train burning case. The entire pattern of invocation, abeyance and deferral, followed by its re-invocation later, shows the exclusionary nature of the politics extraordinary laws represent and thrive on” (pages 62-63). POTA was not applied to the perpetrators of the pogrom in Gujarat.
The author cites facts and figures to establish the selective application of POTA. It was promulgated as an ordinance (Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance) on October 24, 2001, soon after 9/11. On November 2, 2001, Advani said: “If the Opposition opposes the ordinance they will be wittingly or unwittingly helping terrorists.” It became an Act of Parliament in March 2002. It was “more draconian than TADA in many respects” as the Report of the People’s Tribunal established (The Terror of POTA and Other Security Legislation edited by Preeti Verma; Human Rights Law Network, New Delhi; pages 445).
The National Common Minimum Programme of the Government of India, May 2004, pledged its repeal. On September 21, 2004, the President promulgated two ordinances, simultaneously repealing POTA and amending the provisions of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), 1967. In its winter session, both Houses of Parliament gave the ordinances their approval, confirming the removal of POTA from the statute books and replacement of the UAPA, 1967 by the UAPA, 2004. Civil libertarians are rightly critical of those amendments. The BJP never mentions them. POTA’s repeal signified its electoral defeat, which continues to rankle in the Sangh Parivar’s mind.
India is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and is obliged to file periodically reports on its observance of the Covenant. They are examined by the Human Rights Committee set up by the Covenant. It comprises experts who judge independently. Successive Attorneys-General of India have been grilled by the Committee on the country’s security legislation, particularly TADA and the National Security Act, and preventive detention in general. Its proceedings are poorly reported in India. Hearings were held on March 26, 27, 28 and 30 in 1984, March 27, 1991, and on July 24-25, 1997. They welcomed the non-renewal of TADA and expressed fears of its replacement by another draconian law.
Rosalyn Higgins, who became a Judge of the International Court of Justice at The Hague, pointed out, on March 27, 1991, that TADA had provisions “which were clearly incompatible with certain provisions of the Covenant”. This view was widely shared.
A member of the Human Rights Committee, El-Shafei, “asked what protection there was against arbitrary detention and the violation of other protected rights, in view of the overly broad language of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, Article 4(2) of which defined disruption activity as any action which questioned, disrupted or was intended to disrupt, either directly or indirectly, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India. Also, what procedures were available to detainees for complaints against abuses while in detention? Had any such cases been brought, and what had been the outcome?”
TADA’s non-renewal was small comfort. On July 30, 1997, the Human Rights Committee adopted a series of comments on India’s report: “The Committee regrets that the use of special powers of detention remains widespread. While noting the State party’s [India’s] reservation to Article 9 of the Covenant, the Committee considers that this reservation does not exclude, inter alia, the obligation to comply with the requirement to inform promptly the person concerned of the reasons for his or her arrest. The Committee is also of the view that preventive detention is a restriction on liberty imposed as a response to the conduct of the individual concerned, that the decision as to continued detention must be considered as a determination falling within the meaning of Article 14, Paragraph 1, of the Covenant, and that proceedings to decide the continuation of detention must, therefore, comply with that provision…. The question of continued detention should be determined by an independent and impartial tribunal constituted and operating in accordance with Article 14, Paragraph 1, of the Covenant. It further recommends, at the very least, that a central register of detainees under the preventive detention laws be maintained and that the State party accept the admission of the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent to all types of detention facilities, particularly in areas of conflict.”
The Committee’s “Comments” constitute case law and are compiled in a book (The Human Rights Committee by Dominic McGoldrick; Oxford University Press). There are no Muslim vote banks on that Committee. POTA escaped censure because it lasted for three years, from 2001 to 2004.
We must examine the roots of terror and while combating it also redress the wrongs on which terror feeds. On May 28, Union Home Minister Shivraj Patil proposed that rural job, housing and road-construction schemes be intensified in naxalite-affected areas to counter the influence of the Left extremists.
The Darul Uloom’s fatwa, the second after the one on February 25, challenges the preaching of hate and revenge by some Muslim groups. They responded with abusive e-mails (Seema Chishti; The Indian Express, May 23). The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) could sponsor and organise the Mumbai blasts in March 1993 only by drawing on the spirit of revenge created by the riots of December 1992 and January 1993, the massive arrests of Muslims and the impunity with which the Shiv Sena and the Sangh Parivar operated. The Srikrishna Commission noted that.
A.S. Dulat, former Director of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), is no ordinary intelligence veteran. He has operated actively in Kashmir affairs, especially with the Hurriyat leaders, and understands political realities. His article in The Pioneer of May 24 comes as a breath of fresh air in an atmosphere fouled by the McCarthyite fulminations of Advani & Co. and ignorant and simplistic critiques by very many in the media. It bears quotation in extenso: “We have to recognise that terrorism has its origins and society is made up of people and people have minds. Now that we have finally admitted that Pakistani criminals alone don’t fill the ranks of terrorists and that they also include our own people, many of whom, like the SIMI activists, are quite educated and defy the jihadi stereotype, let’s make a sincere, well-thought-out plan to address the Islamic mind. In the 21st Century, despite all the importance claimed by Tech-Int people, the overwhelming importance of Hum-Int cannot be overstated.
“In short, there is a certain ideology that has gained currency in the post-Babri era. The Lashkar-e-Tayyeba, Dawood Ibrahim and all others are fishing in the same pool. Counter-intelligence must focus on the cultural and economic compulsions that are driving Muslim youth into terrorist cells. The British government is doing a good job by encouraging the mainstreaming of Islamic societies in that country. The West has realised the limitations of a purely military solution. There will be nothing gained without seeking to remove the factors that agitate the mind of the Muslim. We must attempt this in a big way in India. One hears of the Justice Sachar Committee report’s recommendations, but what prevents the government from implementing them? Whenever one goes in the U.K., from the moment of landing in Heathrow to the shops of London, one cannot help noticing the proliferation of Muslim youth employed in servicing customers. They have name tags like ‘Abdul’, ‘Razia’ and many of the women even wear hijabs. Therefore, let’s not get fixated by anti-terror laws and federal agencies. Nothing will change unless we change our attitude.”
This is precisely what the BJP refuses to do. It stokes the fires of hate, presides over pogroms and sees POTA as a weapon for crushing the predictable and foolish reaction. That reaction, in turn, provides grist to the BJP’s antiquated mill. Deoband’s challenge and the realism shown by officials like Dulat provide hope that before long sanity in the country will drown the merchants of hate of all hues.
On June 2, 2008, the BJP started violent breast-beating at Nepal’s decision to establish a secular republic in the erstwhile Hindu kingdom. Jaswant Singh cried: “As an Indian and a believer in ‘sanatan dharma’ [Hinduism], I feel diminished… there is nothing more secular than sanatan dharma.” Forget the double-talk in the assertion that a state based on one religion is secular. The lament reveals the BJP’s real goal – the establishment of a Hindu state in India.
Republication or redissemination of the contents of this screen are expressly prohibited
without the written consent of Frontline
Saturday, June 21, 2008
Wednesday, June 11, 2008
Why India went to war with China in 1962: K. Subrahmanyam’s eforts to explore the documents
Frontline
Volume 25 - Issue 12 :: Jun. 07-20, 2008
INDIA'S NATIONAL MAGAZINE
from the publishers of THE HINDU • Contents
ESSAY
1962 - UNTOLD STORY
A.G. NOORANI
The people have a right to know what went wrong in 1962 when India went to war with China.
IT is surely time that the Government of India bestirred itself on inquiries and studies on the wars in which the country’s blood and treasure were expended. The people have a right to know why and how things went the way they did. Eight years ago, the Kargil Review Committee noted: “India has not published authoritative histories of the 1965 and 1971 wars. It is necessary to publish authentic accounts of the 1965 and 1971 wars and to establish the facts.”
If the reports are now in the public domain, it is not because of state action. “Private enterprise” paved the way on the Internet. We owe it to K. Subrahmanyam’s exertions and commitment.
Referring to the Kargil Review Committee’s Report, Defence Minister A.K. Anthony disclosed, in a written reply in the Rajya Sabha on November 21, 2007, “A committee to review the publication of war histories was constituted by the government. The committee has given its recommendations which are being considered for arriving at a final decision on this issue.”
Its report should be published soon. The people are entitled to know when the committee was set up, its composition and terms of reference and its findings and recommendations.
Did publication of the Henderson-Brooks-P.S. Bhagat report on the 1962 war with China form part of its remit? On February 27, 2008, the Defence Minister announced in Parliament the government’s decision not to publish that report. The ground he cited was specious: “Sensitivity of information contained in the report and its security implications” – 45 years after the report was submitted.
On November 9, 1962, while the war was on, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru told the Rajya Sabha that there would be an inquiry at a “suitable time” into the charges of “unpreparedness”. Implied in the promise, surely, was an assurance that the result would be shared with Parliament and the nation. It was instituted to allay public disquiet. He said, clearly enough, “I hope there will be an inquiry so as to find out what mistakes or errors were committed and who were responsible for them.” This was for public edification no less than the government’s.On April 1, 1963, Defence Minister Y.B. Chavan informed the Lok Sabha that “with my approval the Chief of Army Staff [COAS] had ordered a thorough investigation to be carried out”. He specified the issues for the probe. The task was entrusted to Lieutenant-General T.B. Henderson-Brooks and Brigadier P.S. Bhagat. On May 12, they submitted their report to the COAS, who, in turn, forwarded it to the Defence Minister, with his comments, on July 2. Chavan made a formal statement on the report to the Lok Sabha on September 2, 1963.
“Consideration of security”
“This inquiry is the type of inquiry which the Prime Minister had in mind when he promised such an inquiry to the House in November 1992.” But, he now said, “it would not be in the public interest to lay the report on the table of the House”. Not even an abridged or edited version of it, consistent with “consideration of security”. Since that was the consideration, there should be no bar to its publication now. “Information about the strength and deployment of our forces and their locations would be of invaluable use to our enemies” in 1963. It is pure history in 2008.
In 1970, a mere seven years later, came Neville Maxwell’s book India’s China War. Its reference to “an unpublished Indian Army report on these events” and, indeed, the contents of the book, left none in doubt that he had had access to the report. All doubt has since been dispelled by his citation of precise details of the report in an article entitled “Henderson-Brooks Report: An Introduction” published in the Economic and Political Weekly on April 14, 2001, He subsequently put it up on the Internet. He wrote: “The Henderson-Brooks Report is long (its main section, excluding recommendations and many annexures, covers nearly 200 foolscap pages), detailed and far ranging. This introduction will touch only upon some select points, to give the flavour of the whole…..”
Are the people of India to be denied a report that is available and has been publicised by a foreign writer? Or, is the government waiting for him to put the entire report online?
In 1963, the nation readily accepted Chavan’s plea of “the public interest”. In 2008, it cannot and must not. Section 8(1) (a) of the Right to Information Act (RTI), 2005, says that “there shall be no obligation to give any citizen information the disclosure of which would prejudicially affect ... the security, the strategic … interests of the State, relations with a foreign State …” None of these applies today. Note that Section 8 (1) does not impose a bar. It says only that there is no “obligation” to give the information. It is open to the government in its discretion to provide it even if it falls within Section 8 (1) (a). Clause 2 explicitly confers that discretion: “if public interest in disclosure overweighs the harm to the protected interests”.
In recent years, Chinese journals and memoirs have provided China’s version of the war of 1962. India’s relations with China will not suffer by publication of the report, nor will national security. Those who support its suppression on the grounds that it would affect a great national hero’s reputation do Jawaharlal Nehru’s memory no service. Whole shelves of libraries are full of studies documenting Winston Churchill’s mistakes during the Second World War. The opposition of the day, the Jan Sangh, the Swatantra and the Socialists, were all for “action”, crying “appeasement”. They are as culpable as he on the foolish adventure that was the Forward Policy. Partisanship in such a matter is indecent. Statements by leaders of the opposition during that period, if recalled, would do them little credit. It was a national failure, and publication of a study of the war is very much in the national interest.
War inquiries have hallowed precedents. Britain held an inquiry into the conduct of the Crimean War in the 19th century. During the First World War, a Special Commission was set up by an Act of Parliament to inquire into the Dardanelles campaign. The terms of reference were “for the purpose of inquiring into the origin, inception and conduct of operations or war in the Dardanelles and Gallipoli, including the supply of drafts, reinforcements, ammunition and equipment to the troops and fleet, the provision for the sick and wounded, and the responsibility of those departments of the government whose duty it has been to minister to the wants of the forces employed in that theatre of war”.
Pentagon papers
What was the genesis of the famous Pentagon Papers? In 1967, Defence Secretary Robert McNamara commissioned a study of how the United States had come to fall into the deep marsh that was Vietnam.
A Vietnam History Task Force produced, in 47 volumes of documents, a history of the U.S.’ involvement in the Vietnam war. Fifteen sets of these, known as the Pentagon Papers, were prepared. Daniel Ellsberg, a former official in the Defence Department, secretly copied them while still in government service. He gave them to The New York Times and The Washington Post. The Supreme Court upheld their publication.
A modern classic
There is a modern classic – the Report of the Inquiry Commission headed by Dr. Shimon Agranat, President of Israel’s Supreme Court, and comprising four other members, on the Yom Kippur War. It began on October 6, 1973, and ended on October 22, when Egypt agreed on a ceasefire. The Israeli Cabinet appointed the commission as early as on November 18 to probe, mainly, two matters – intelligence and deployment of the Israeli Defence Forces. It submitted a report on April 1, 1974, but promised a further report that would contain “a detailed description of the facts and a complete exposition of the Commission’s conclusions”. The “Partial Report” was published in 1975.
The Commission cautioned that the later report would “contain many secret facts which in all probability will rule out publications in full”. On April 4, 1994, the Cabinet authorised the release of the final report. It runs into seven volumes. Significant extracts from the classic were reproduced in a book published in 2000.
The terms of reference covered politicians in power as well as soldiers: “The information, in the days preceding the Yom Kippur War, concerning the enemy’s moves and his intentions to open war, as well as the assessments and the decisions of the duly authorised military and civilian bodies with regard to the aforementioned information.
“The Israeli Defence Forces’ deployment for battle in general, its preparedness in the days preceding the Yom Kippur War and its actions up to the containment of the enemy.”
Eliyahu Winograd, a retired judge, was asked to inquire into Israel’s war against the Hizbollah in Lebanon in 2006. His 629-page final report was published on January 30, 2008. He found “grave failings” among both political and military leaders. An interim report was published on April 30, 2007, with remarkable despatch. It censured Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who had testified before the inquiry. One wishes our judges would show similar despatch and our politicians equal concern for transparency.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in the Pentagon Papers case provides a good guide for the government, as also for the Central Information Commission if it is moved to order disclosure. Justice Hugo Black said: “The guarding of military and diplomatic secrets at the expense of informed representative government provides no real security for our Republic.”
Justice Potter Stewart propounded a good test – “direct immediate and irreparable damage to our Nation and its people”. The case was decided in June 1971, while the Vietnam war was on.
A more recent precedent is even more relevant. Clause 2 of Section 8 of the RTI explicitly confers a discretion: “if public interest in disclosure outweighs the harm to the protected interests.” Invoking such a provision in the Freedom of Information Act, the United Kingdom’s Information Commissioner, Richard Thomas, ordered, on February 26, 2008, disclosure of the minutes of two Cabinet meetings in March 2003 at which Ministers discussed Attorney-General Lord Goldsmith’s advice on the legality of the war on Iraq.
That war is still on. The 1962 war ended that very year.•
Volume 25 - Issue 12 :: Jun. 07-20, 2008
INDIA'S NATIONAL MAGAZINE
from the publishers of THE HINDU • Contents
ESSAY
1962 - UNTOLD STORY
A.G. NOORANI
The people have a right to know what went wrong in 1962 when India went to war with China.
IT is surely time that the Government of India bestirred itself on inquiries and studies on the wars in which the country’s blood and treasure were expended. The people have a right to know why and how things went the way they did. Eight years ago, the Kargil Review Committee noted: “India has not published authoritative histories of the 1965 and 1971 wars. It is necessary to publish authentic accounts of the 1965 and 1971 wars and to establish the facts.”
If the reports are now in the public domain, it is not because of state action. “Private enterprise” paved the way on the Internet. We owe it to K. Subrahmanyam’s exertions and commitment.
Referring to the Kargil Review Committee’s Report, Defence Minister A.K. Anthony disclosed, in a written reply in the Rajya Sabha on November 21, 2007, “A committee to review the publication of war histories was constituted by the government. The committee has given its recommendations which are being considered for arriving at a final decision on this issue.”
Its report should be published soon. The people are entitled to know when the committee was set up, its composition and terms of reference and its findings and recommendations.
Did publication of the Henderson-Brooks-P.S. Bhagat report on the 1962 war with China form part of its remit? On February 27, 2008, the Defence Minister announced in Parliament the government’s decision not to publish that report. The ground he cited was specious: “Sensitivity of information contained in the report and its security implications” – 45 years after the report was submitted.
On November 9, 1962, while the war was on, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru told the Rajya Sabha that there would be an inquiry at a “suitable time” into the charges of “unpreparedness”. Implied in the promise, surely, was an assurance that the result would be shared with Parliament and the nation. It was instituted to allay public disquiet. He said, clearly enough, “I hope there will be an inquiry so as to find out what mistakes or errors were committed and who were responsible for them.” This was for public edification no less than the government’s.On April 1, 1963, Defence Minister Y.B. Chavan informed the Lok Sabha that “with my approval the Chief of Army Staff [COAS] had ordered a thorough investigation to be carried out”. He specified the issues for the probe. The task was entrusted to Lieutenant-General T.B. Henderson-Brooks and Brigadier P.S. Bhagat. On May 12, they submitted their report to the COAS, who, in turn, forwarded it to the Defence Minister, with his comments, on July 2. Chavan made a formal statement on the report to the Lok Sabha on September 2, 1963.
“Consideration of security”
“This inquiry is the type of inquiry which the Prime Minister had in mind when he promised such an inquiry to the House in November 1992.” But, he now said, “it would not be in the public interest to lay the report on the table of the House”. Not even an abridged or edited version of it, consistent with “consideration of security”. Since that was the consideration, there should be no bar to its publication now. “Information about the strength and deployment of our forces and their locations would be of invaluable use to our enemies” in 1963. It is pure history in 2008.
In 1970, a mere seven years later, came Neville Maxwell’s book India’s China War. Its reference to “an unpublished Indian Army report on these events” and, indeed, the contents of the book, left none in doubt that he had had access to the report. All doubt has since been dispelled by his citation of precise details of the report in an article entitled “Henderson-Brooks Report: An Introduction” published in the Economic and Political Weekly on April 14, 2001, He subsequently put it up on the Internet. He wrote: “The Henderson-Brooks Report is long (its main section, excluding recommendations and many annexures, covers nearly 200 foolscap pages), detailed and far ranging. This introduction will touch only upon some select points, to give the flavour of the whole…..”
Are the people of India to be denied a report that is available and has been publicised by a foreign writer? Or, is the government waiting for him to put the entire report online?
In 1963, the nation readily accepted Chavan’s plea of “the public interest”. In 2008, it cannot and must not. Section 8(1) (a) of the Right to Information Act (RTI), 2005, says that “there shall be no obligation to give any citizen information the disclosure of which would prejudicially affect ... the security, the strategic … interests of the State, relations with a foreign State …” None of these applies today. Note that Section 8 (1) does not impose a bar. It says only that there is no “obligation” to give the information. It is open to the government in its discretion to provide it even if it falls within Section 8 (1) (a). Clause 2 explicitly confers that discretion: “if public interest in disclosure overweighs the harm to the protected interests”.
In recent years, Chinese journals and memoirs have provided China’s version of the war of 1962. India’s relations with China will not suffer by publication of the report, nor will national security. Those who support its suppression on the grounds that it would affect a great national hero’s reputation do Jawaharlal Nehru’s memory no service. Whole shelves of libraries are full of studies documenting Winston Churchill’s mistakes during the Second World War. The opposition of the day, the Jan Sangh, the Swatantra and the Socialists, were all for “action”, crying “appeasement”. They are as culpable as he on the foolish adventure that was the Forward Policy. Partisanship in such a matter is indecent. Statements by leaders of the opposition during that period, if recalled, would do them little credit. It was a national failure, and publication of a study of the war is very much in the national interest.
War inquiries have hallowed precedents. Britain held an inquiry into the conduct of the Crimean War in the 19th century. During the First World War, a Special Commission was set up by an Act of Parliament to inquire into the Dardanelles campaign. The terms of reference were “for the purpose of inquiring into the origin, inception and conduct of operations or war in the Dardanelles and Gallipoli, including the supply of drafts, reinforcements, ammunition and equipment to the troops and fleet, the provision for the sick and wounded, and the responsibility of those departments of the government whose duty it has been to minister to the wants of the forces employed in that theatre of war”.
Pentagon papers
What was the genesis of the famous Pentagon Papers? In 1967, Defence Secretary Robert McNamara commissioned a study of how the United States had come to fall into the deep marsh that was Vietnam.
A Vietnam History Task Force produced, in 47 volumes of documents, a history of the U.S.’ involvement in the Vietnam war. Fifteen sets of these, known as the Pentagon Papers, were prepared. Daniel Ellsberg, a former official in the Defence Department, secretly copied them while still in government service. He gave them to The New York Times and The Washington Post. The Supreme Court upheld their publication.
A modern classic
There is a modern classic – the Report of the Inquiry Commission headed by Dr. Shimon Agranat, President of Israel’s Supreme Court, and comprising four other members, on the Yom Kippur War. It began on October 6, 1973, and ended on October 22, when Egypt agreed on a ceasefire. The Israeli Cabinet appointed the commission as early as on November 18 to probe, mainly, two matters – intelligence and deployment of the Israeli Defence Forces. It submitted a report on April 1, 1974, but promised a further report that would contain “a detailed description of the facts and a complete exposition of the Commission’s conclusions”. The “Partial Report” was published in 1975.
The Commission cautioned that the later report would “contain many secret facts which in all probability will rule out publications in full”. On April 4, 1994, the Cabinet authorised the release of the final report. It runs into seven volumes. Significant extracts from the classic were reproduced in a book published in 2000.
The terms of reference covered politicians in power as well as soldiers: “The information, in the days preceding the Yom Kippur War, concerning the enemy’s moves and his intentions to open war, as well as the assessments and the decisions of the duly authorised military and civilian bodies with regard to the aforementioned information.
“The Israeli Defence Forces’ deployment for battle in general, its preparedness in the days preceding the Yom Kippur War and its actions up to the containment of the enemy.”
Eliyahu Winograd, a retired judge, was asked to inquire into Israel’s war against the Hizbollah in Lebanon in 2006. His 629-page final report was published on January 30, 2008. He found “grave failings” among both political and military leaders. An interim report was published on April 30, 2007, with remarkable despatch. It censured Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who had testified before the inquiry. One wishes our judges would show similar despatch and our politicians equal concern for transparency.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in the Pentagon Papers case provides a good guide for the government, as also for the Central Information Commission if it is moved to order disclosure. Justice Hugo Black said: “The guarding of military and diplomatic secrets at the expense of informed representative government provides no real security for our Republic.”
Justice Potter Stewart propounded a good test – “direct immediate and irreparable damage to our Nation and its people”. The case was decided in June 1971, while the Vietnam war was on.
A more recent precedent is even more relevant. Clause 2 of Section 8 of the RTI explicitly confers a discretion: “if public interest in disclosure outweighs the harm to the protected interests.” Invoking such a provision in the Freedom of Information Act, the United Kingdom’s Information Commissioner, Richard Thomas, ordered, on February 26, 2008, disclosure of the minutes of two Cabinet meetings in March 2003 at which Ministers discussed Attorney-General Lord Goldsmith’s advice on the legality of the war on Iraq.
That war is still on. The 1962 war ended that very year.•
Tuesday, June 10, 2008
Gold deal gone wrong, Indian peacekeepers hit back: UN
Gold deal gone wrong, Indian peacekeepers hit back: UN
Wed, Jun 11 02:20 AM
To recover $480 they had paid as part of a gold deal, Indian peacekeepers in Congo illegally detained, physically assaulted and "sexually propositioned" a local gold trader who had sold them counterfeit gold dust, a UN investigation on charges of misconduct in the country's North Kivu province has revealed.
The report prepared by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), however, says it failed to find evidence against the Indian contingent on allegations ranging from gun smuggling to selling rations and fuel to rebel militia.
On one of the charges, the report says there is evidence to prove that three members of an Indian unit based at Nyabiondo purchased "counterfeit gold and unlawfully detained a local resident". It recommends India take appropriate action against the peacekeepers.
The three Army personnel have been identified in the UN report as "JCO Deepak Singh Nayal, Sergeant Suresh Pandurang Bodhak and Lt Col Talum Duby". The Army has also initiated a court of inquiry against the personnel who have since returned home.
While India has dismissed the charges as trivial, the UN report paints a grim picture and says the local gold trader told UN investigators that he was asked to "perform menial tasks in the camp" and was "sexually propositioned" before being released by paying up $480 to Indian peacekeepers.
"The dealer told investigators that whilst in detention he was physically assaulted, was required to perform menial tasks in the camp, and was sexually propositioned by one of the peacekeepers," states the report.
Reconstructing the incident, the UN report says that Nayal and Bodhak bought a small glass bottle of what appeared to be powdered gold from a local dealer at village Tilbua near their camp on an unspecified date in 2006.
But when an appraiser in Goma determined that the "gold" was actually pulverized Gold deal gone wrong, Indian peacekeepers took it out on trader: UN report
gold-coloured metal from a padlock, the two peacekeepers "arrested" the gold dealer and confined him to a dilapidated building within the Indian camp.
"The dealer was subsequently detained at the Indian camp for an undetermined length of time with his release contingent on repayment of the purchase price to the Indian contingent members. The dealer finally collected enough money and was released, allegedly after paying US $480," states the report.
Concluding that there is sufficient evidence to substantiate charges of illegal detention of a local resident, the UN OIOS recommends that "appropriate action" be taken by India against the three personnel.
While the report says that other allegations like gun running and having connections with local militia could not be corroborated, it says that "Indian authorities may wish to consider other avenues of inquiry" as they have the potential to "damage the reputation of the Indian military"
Wed, Jun 11 02:20 AM
To recover $480 they had paid as part of a gold deal, Indian peacekeepers in Congo illegally detained, physically assaulted and "sexually propositioned" a local gold trader who had sold them counterfeit gold dust, a UN investigation on charges of misconduct in the country's North Kivu province has revealed.
The report prepared by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), however, says it failed to find evidence against the Indian contingent on allegations ranging from gun smuggling to selling rations and fuel to rebel militia.
On one of the charges, the report says there is evidence to prove that three members of an Indian unit based at Nyabiondo purchased "counterfeit gold and unlawfully detained a local resident". It recommends India take appropriate action against the peacekeepers.
The three Army personnel have been identified in the UN report as "JCO Deepak Singh Nayal, Sergeant Suresh Pandurang Bodhak and Lt Col Talum Duby". The Army has also initiated a court of inquiry against the personnel who have since returned home.
While India has dismissed the charges as trivial, the UN report paints a grim picture and says the local gold trader told UN investigators that he was asked to "perform menial tasks in the camp" and was "sexually propositioned" before being released by paying up $480 to Indian peacekeepers.
"The dealer told investigators that whilst in detention he was physically assaulted, was required to perform menial tasks in the camp, and was sexually propositioned by one of the peacekeepers," states the report.
Reconstructing the incident, the UN report says that Nayal and Bodhak bought a small glass bottle of what appeared to be powdered gold from a local dealer at village Tilbua near their camp on an unspecified date in 2006.
But when an appraiser in Goma determined that the "gold" was actually pulverized Gold deal gone wrong, Indian peacekeepers took it out on trader: UN report
gold-coloured metal from a padlock, the two peacekeepers "arrested" the gold dealer and confined him to a dilapidated building within the Indian camp.
"The dealer was subsequently detained at the Indian camp for an undetermined length of time with his release contingent on repayment of the purchase price to the Indian contingent members. The dealer finally collected enough money and was released, allegedly after paying US $480," states the report.
Concluding that there is sufficient evidence to substantiate charges of illegal detention of a local resident, the UN OIOS recommends that "appropriate action" be taken by India against the three personnel.
While the report says that other allegations like gun running and having connections with local militia could not be corroborated, it says that "Indian authorities may wish to consider other avenues of inquiry" as they have the potential to "damage the reputation of the Indian military"
Monday, June 9, 2008
The insanity of Guantánamo
The insanity of Guantánamo
Despite U.S. claims of humane treatment, a new report reveals that prisoners -- even some long ago cleared to leave -- are spiraling into hallucinations, despair and suicide.
Editor's note: In this article, Jennifer Daskal and Stacy Sullivan report -- in the greatest detail published to date -- on the deteriorating mental health of prisoners at Guantánamo Bay. The two staff members of the nonprofit group Human Rights Watch produced a new in-depth report published Tuesday by the organization, on which this article is based. They have also contributed to Salon's continuing coverage of U.S. judicial proceedings at Guantánamo Bay.
By Jennifer Daskal and Stacy Sullivan
Pages 1 2
A detainee peers out through the "bean hole" used to pass food and other items into his cell at Guantánamo Bay (Dec. 4, 2006).
June 10, 2008 | GUANTÁNAMO BAY, Cuba -- "I feel like I'm being buried alive," said Ahmed Belbacha, a 39-year-old Algerian who has been in Guantánamo since March 2002. He has been cleared to leave the prison camp for over a year, but he can't.
Algeria isn't accepting detainees back home, but even it were, Belbacha is so fearful of being tortured there that he has asked the U.S. federal courts to block his return. But there is no other country willing to take him, and he remains stuck in Guantánamo -- locked in his windowless cell 22 hours a day, with little more than a Koran and single other book to occupy his time.
In December, Belbacha reportedly tried to commit suicide and was moved to the mental health facility. He was stripped naked, dressed in a green plastic rip-proof suicide smock, and placed in an individual cell under constant monitoring --Guantánamo's suicide watch. He says he was given absolutely nothing else in his cell -- no toothbrush, no soap, no books, nothing he could somehow use to injure himself.
Enjoy this story?Buzz up!Thanks for
your support.
Each morning a member of the mental health staff reportedly came by and asked the same set of questions: Do you want to hurt yourself? Do you want to hurt anyone else? Are you sleeping well? Are you eating well?
Close to two months later, he apparently had answered all the questions correctly and was moved back to another windowless cell.
More than half of the 270 detainees currently at Guantánamo -- including many who are slated for release or transfer -- are housed in high-security facilities akin to U.S. "supermax" prisons. They spend all but two hours a day in small cells with no natural light or fresh air. Their meals are slipped through a slot in the door, and they are given little more than a single book and the Koran to occupy their time. Even their limited "recreation" time -- which is sometimes provided in the middle of the night -- generally takes place in single cell cages so that detainees can't physically interact with one another. None of these detainees have been allowed visits by family members, and very few have been able to make phone calls home.
As a result, many detainee lawyers say, their clients are suffering from serious and even dangerous mental health problems. Several have tried to commit suicide, some of them multiple times. Others have reported having visions and hearing voices. Some show strong signs of depression and anxiety disorder.
The Department of Defense does not allow any outsiders, including journalists and representatives of nongovernmental organizations, to speak with the detainees at Guantánamo, so it is difficult to get a full picture of the prison conditions and the toll they may be taking on detainee mental health. In addition, the DOD has generally prohibited attorneys from bringing in outside psychiatrists to evaluate the mental health of their clients, forcing attorneys to rely on "proxy" evaluations based on questionnaires the lawyers administer to their clients.
However, in a new report based on interviews with government officials and attorneys for detainees, as well as declassified notes attorneys took in meetings with detainees, Human Rights Watch has pieced together a physical description of the various "camps" at Guantánamo and the inhumane conditions that prevail within them. Titled "Locked Up Alone: Detention Conditions and Mental Health at Guantánamo," the report also documents the increasingly frequent complaints of mental health deterioration among the more than one dozen detainees profiled in case studies.
Mohammad El Gharani, a young Chadian who was born and raised in Saudi Arabia, was reportedly arrested at a mosque in Karachi, Pakistan, when he was only 15 years old and brought to Guantánamo in early 2002. He was wrongly classified as 25 and held as an adult. (He is now 21.) For the past two years, he has been held in two of Guantánamo's most restrictive high-security camps.
Gharani's lawyers say he has tried to commit suicide at least seven times. He has slit his wrist, run repeatedly headfirst into the sides of his cell, and tried to hang himself. On several occasions, he has been put on suicide watch in the mental health unit, given the green suicide smock, and placed in a single cell with no other items other than toilet paper. Each time, he has been moved out of the suicide unit and back into high-security detention.
Often subject to punishment for reported disciplinary problems, El Gharani says he is often left with nothing in his cell other than a mat for sleeping, a Koran and toilet paper. He says that at times even some of the basic items that all detainees are reportedly allowed at all times -- including a finger toothbrush and small bar of soap -- have been taken away.
He has never been provided any educational or additional recreation opportunities in accordance with his juvenile status at the time of capture. He has never been allowed to speak with -- let alone see -- any of his family members during his more than six years in U.S. custody. Like the majority of detainees at Guantánamo, he has not been charged with any crime.
A Guantánamo detainee named Walid, a 28-year-old Palestinian (whose lawyers requested that we withhold his last name), was reportedly sold to the United States by the Pakistani security forces, after the U.S. began offering bounties for suspected terrorists. He was among the first arrivals to Guantánamo Bay in early 2002. As of February 2008, he was "approved to leave" by U.S. officials -- yet since 2007, he has been held in one of the high-security camps.
Since his arrest, Walid has had very little contact with his family, who thought he was dead until, several years after his initial detention, he was able to send them a postcard. He has not, to his attorney's knowledge, been able to speak with any of his family members. Since learning of his whereabouts in 2005, his family has been writing to him and has sent him photos, including pictures of nieces and nephews he has never met.
Around 2003 or 2004 he went on a hunger strike for 20 months and was force-fed through intubation. At one point Walid, who is approximately 5 feet 10 inches tall, weighed only 96 pounds.
His attorneys report that they have long been worried about Walid's mental health, which they believe has been deteriorating over time. They describe him as lethargic, listless and distracted, and took the following notes of his speech:
I love cowboys. I love Indians. I feel like they're my family ... I knew an Indian woman in Gaza -- she talked a witch language. I won't tell you her name because she might send me a witch curse ... Tarzan is a lovely person -- very polite -- he's my friend, though he doesn't [know] it. I don't watch for entertainment but for another reason -- a secret -- I won't tell you ... I live in heaven, heaven is in my chest. I love Jesus, I want to see him, and all the mermaids around them.
After the U.S. denied Walid's attorneys' requests to release Walid's medical records, and knowing that they would not be allowed to bring in an independent psychiatrist to evaluate him in person, Walid's attorneys retained Dr. Daryl Matthews, a psychiatrist once hired by the Department of Defense to evaluate the mental health facilities at Guantánamo. They asked Matthews to prepare a questionnaire by which he could do a proxy psychological assessment. From the results of this questionnaire, Matthews concluded that Walid appears to have developed schizophrenia and suffers from delusions, significant anxiety and depression.
Despite U.S. claims of humane treatment, a new report reveals that prisoners -- even some long ago cleared to leave -- are spiraling into hallucinations, despair and suicide.
Editor's note: In this article, Jennifer Daskal and Stacy Sullivan report -- in the greatest detail published to date -- on the deteriorating mental health of prisoners at Guantánamo Bay. The two staff members of the nonprofit group Human Rights Watch produced a new in-depth report published Tuesday by the organization, on which this article is based. They have also contributed to Salon's continuing coverage of U.S. judicial proceedings at Guantánamo Bay.
By Jennifer Daskal and Stacy Sullivan
Pages 1 2
A detainee peers out through the "bean hole" used to pass food and other items into his cell at Guantánamo Bay (Dec. 4, 2006).
June 10, 2008 | GUANTÁNAMO BAY, Cuba -- "I feel like I'm being buried alive," said Ahmed Belbacha, a 39-year-old Algerian who has been in Guantánamo since March 2002. He has been cleared to leave the prison camp for over a year, but he can't.
Algeria isn't accepting detainees back home, but even it were, Belbacha is so fearful of being tortured there that he has asked the U.S. federal courts to block his return. But there is no other country willing to take him, and he remains stuck in Guantánamo -- locked in his windowless cell 22 hours a day, with little more than a Koran and single other book to occupy his time.
In December, Belbacha reportedly tried to commit suicide and was moved to the mental health facility. He was stripped naked, dressed in a green plastic rip-proof suicide smock, and placed in an individual cell under constant monitoring --Guantánamo's suicide watch. He says he was given absolutely nothing else in his cell -- no toothbrush, no soap, no books, nothing he could somehow use to injure himself.
Enjoy this story?Buzz up!Thanks for
your support.
Each morning a member of the mental health staff reportedly came by and asked the same set of questions: Do you want to hurt yourself? Do you want to hurt anyone else? Are you sleeping well? Are you eating well?
Close to two months later, he apparently had answered all the questions correctly and was moved back to another windowless cell.
More than half of the 270 detainees currently at Guantánamo -- including many who are slated for release or transfer -- are housed in high-security facilities akin to U.S. "supermax" prisons. They spend all but two hours a day in small cells with no natural light or fresh air. Their meals are slipped through a slot in the door, and they are given little more than a single book and the Koran to occupy their time. Even their limited "recreation" time -- which is sometimes provided in the middle of the night -- generally takes place in single cell cages so that detainees can't physically interact with one another. None of these detainees have been allowed visits by family members, and very few have been able to make phone calls home.
As a result, many detainee lawyers say, their clients are suffering from serious and even dangerous mental health problems. Several have tried to commit suicide, some of them multiple times. Others have reported having visions and hearing voices. Some show strong signs of depression and anxiety disorder.
The Department of Defense does not allow any outsiders, including journalists and representatives of nongovernmental organizations, to speak with the detainees at Guantánamo, so it is difficult to get a full picture of the prison conditions and the toll they may be taking on detainee mental health. In addition, the DOD has generally prohibited attorneys from bringing in outside psychiatrists to evaluate the mental health of their clients, forcing attorneys to rely on "proxy" evaluations based on questionnaires the lawyers administer to their clients.
However, in a new report based on interviews with government officials and attorneys for detainees, as well as declassified notes attorneys took in meetings with detainees, Human Rights Watch has pieced together a physical description of the various "camps" at Guantánamo and the inhumane conditions that prevail within them. Titled "Locked Up Alone: Detention Conditions and Mental Health at Guantánamo," the report also documents the increasingly frequent complaints of mental health deterioration among the more than one dozen detainees profiled in case studies.
Mohammad El Gharani, a young Chadian who was born and raised in Saudi Arabia, was reportedly arrested at a mosque in Karachi, Pakistan, when he was only 15 years old and brought to Guantánamo in early 2002. He was wrongly classified as 25 and held as an adult. (He is now 21.) For the past two years, he has been held in two of Guantánamo's most restrictive high-security camps.
Gharani's lawyers say he has tried to commit suicide at least seven times. He has slit his wrist, run repeatedly headfirst into the sides of his cell, and tried to hang himself. On several occasions, he has been put on suicide watch in the mental health unit, given the green suicide smock, and placed in a single cell with no other items other than toilet paper. Each time, he has been moved out of the suicide unit and back into high-security detention.
Often subject to punishment for reported disciplinary problems, El Gharani says he is often left with nothing in his cell other than a mat for sleeping, a Koran and toilet paper. He says that at times even some of the basic items that all detainees are reportedly allowed at all times -- including a finger toothbrush and small bar of soap -- have been taken away.
He has never been provided any educational or additional recreation opportunities in accordance with his juvenile status at the time of capture. He has never been allowed to speak with -- let alone see -- any of his family members during his more than six years in U.S. custody. Like the majority of detainees at Guantánamo, he has not been charged with any crime.
A Guantánamo detainee named Walid, a 28-year-old Palestinian (whose lawyers requested that we withhold his last name), was reportedly sold to the United States by the Pakistani security forces, after the U.S. began offering bounties for suspected terrorists. He was among the first arrivals to Guantánamo Bay in early 2002. As of February 2008, he was "approved to leave" by U.S. officials -- yet since 2007, he has been held in one of the high-security camps.
Since his arrest, Walid has had very little contact with his family, who thought he was dead until, several years after his initial detention, he was able to send them a postcard. He has not, to his attorney's knowledge, been able to speak with any of his family members. Since learning of his whereabouts in 2005, his family has been writing to him and has sent him photos, including pictures of nieces and nephews he has never met.
Around 2003 or 2004 he went on a hunger strike for 20 months and was force-fed through intubation. At one point Walid, who is approximately 5 feet 10 inches tall, weighed only 96 pounds.
His attorneys report that they have long been worried about Walid's mental health, which they believe has been deteriorating over time. They describe him as lethargic, listless and distracted, and took the following notes of his speech:
I love cowboys. I love Indians. I feel like they're my family ... I knew an Indian woman in Gaza -- she talked a witch language. I won't tell you her name because she might send me a witch curse ... Tarzan is a lovely person -- very polite -- he's my friend, though he doesn't [know] it. I don't watch for entertainment but for another reason -- a secret -- I won't tell you ... I live in heaven, heaven is in my chest. I love Jesus, I want to see him, and all the mermaids around them.
After the U.S. denied Walid's attorneys' requests to release Walid's medical records, and knowing that they would not be allowed to bring in an independent psychiatrist to evaluate him in person, Walid's attorneys retained Dr. Daryl Matthews, a psychiatrist once hired by the Department of Defense to evaluate the mental health facilities at Guantánamo. They asked Matthews to prepare a questionnaire by which he could do a proxy psychological assessment. From the results of this questionnaire, Matthews concluded that Walid appears to have developed schizophrenia and suffers from delusions, significant anxiety and depression.
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